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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from one of the two cases tried 
before the same judge on the same day, Circuit Court Judge 
Kenneth G. Anderton sitting as district judge pro tern. This case 
was tried on the same day consecutively and involved the same 
parties as case number 16576 under separate brief. 
This case c1arged a violation of 76-5-404, Utah Code 
Annotated 1973, as amended, charging indecent sexual abuse with 
the same person as in t1e related case of forcible sodomy, said 
offense alleged to have occurred on the 15th day of September, 
1977. 
The other case, a charge of forcible sodomy with a 
person under the age of fourteen years, alleged to have occurred 
on or about the 24th day of February, 1978. 
The preliminary hearings on both cases were held jointly. 
Motions for change of venu~ ani to quash, together with memorandums 
thereon, with joint assign~ent of the cases by the Presiding Judge 
of the Fourth District to Judge Kenneth G. Anderton were joint, 
however, the trials were held on the same day but consecutively 
one after the other. The court took both matters under advise-
ment; later, but on the same date, in each case denied defense 
counsel's motions based on the purported victim's competency and 
found defendant guilty on separate documents which were identical 
other than the number of the case. 
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The court sentenced defendant to the statutory five 
years to life on the forcible sodomy and zero to five years on 
the indecent sexual abuse, to run concurrently with the d so omy; 
referred the defendant to the Department of Corrections for a 
ninety-day evaluation and subsequently referred him for a furthe: 
ninety-day evaluation. 
The court makes no findings other than the competency 0r 
the child; no findings as to time, place, or other factual bases. 
The sentencings were together, however, when notices of appeal 
were filed and the motions for certification of probable cause a: 
certification of the record were made as to both cases the Clerl 
of the District Court filed the transcript of preliminary hearin· 
and a portion of the motions in case number 16577 and filed the 
balance of the motions in case number 16576, making it necessarv 
to consider the two cases together in order to do substantial 
justice. Although the cases are separate, the preliminary hefilt 
were together, all motions and orders prior to trial were filed 
jointly and both appeals certified upon records were left incomp: 
The parties in each case and the principal witness are t: 
same. 
It is pointed out that when the Clerk of the DistrictC~ 
for Vernal County transferred the records and numbered the recor: 
sheets that she left some documents out in each case, said docu· 
ments to be found in the other case. The important portions of 
toaer these are motions to quash and motions for change of venue, ,· 
-2-
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with the transcript of the preliminary hearing found at R.015 to 
R.068, in case number 16577, those matter not being filed at any 
place in case number 16576. 
The writer is filing two briefs. In each case the State-
ment of Facts is different, not as to references to the trials at 
the district court level, but as to references in each case to 
other portions of the file, to wit, references to the preliminary 
hearing and the motions to quash, to vacate, and the rulings thereon, 
are carrying record reference numbers from case number 16577. In 
those instances where references are used in case number 16576, an 
asterisk will be added. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant requests a reversal and dismissal on each case 
or, in the alternative, reversal and remand for a new trial with 
directions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(The references herein are to the record in case nu.rnber 
16577 of the joint preliminary hearing.) 
The statement of facts as to each case will be stated 
separately, however, references to the record will refer to the 
same preliminary hearing transcript by different record numbers 
as the same preliminary hearing transcript differs as to record 
numbers in each file. 
-3-
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Defendant was charged on the 5th day of June 1978, i: 
the Justice Court of Duchesne County; C. Dean Powell, Justi~ 
of the Peace, presiding, with a violation of 76-5-403, a firs: 
degree felony alleged to have occurred on the 24th day of 
February, 1978 (R.2) and an act or charge of forcible sexual 
abuse alleged to have occurred on the 15th day of September, 
1977. Both offenses are alleged to have taken place in the 
defendant's residence in Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
Preliminary hearing was heard by Justice of the Peace 
Powell with Rex J. Hanson representing defendant. 
Nicole was the only witness other than two pages of 
testimony by Robert May, her stepfather, a pages 53-4. 
Nicole testified that she was six years of age (R.27: 
that her birthday was July 7th (R. 27); and that she was in the 
first grade at school. She didn't know what grades she got~ 
school; she didn't know what it meant when she held up her 
hand in front of the judge ( R. 2 8) ; she didn't know the differ· 
ence between right and wrong (R.28-9); she didn't know why it 
was wrong to tell a lie (R. 29); she didn't know what it was to 
tell a lie or tell the truth (R. 29), and at R. 52, on question 
by Mr. Hanson, she testified: 
"Q. Did your Mom ever tell you what to say when 
you got here today? 
A. Yes." 
-4-
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She testified at trial in district court on June 6th 
that she was almost eight (R.124); that her birthday was 
July 27th, as distinguished from July 7th (R.24); that she 
went to school and was in the first grade (R.24), and then 
changed her testimony to the second grade (R.25); that she 
got good grades (R.125); that her teacher was Miss Johnson 
(R.125), where she had testified under oath a few hours 
previously that her teacher was Miss Galloway and that she was 
in the first grade and, when asked who her first grade teacher 
was, she didn't respond. 
She testified that she know what it meant to tell the 
truth (R.127) and that she knew the difference between the 
truth and a lie (R.127) and that the difference was that the 
truth is "when you are telling the truth and lying is when 
you are making up a story"; that it is wrong to tell a story; 
all this in direct contradiction to the testimony before the 
justice of the peace eleven months earlier. 
Thereupon, Mr. Draney submitted Nicole as a competent 
witness and the court reserved its ruling as it had in the 
earlier case. 
At this point, due to separate hearings, the 
Statement of Facts moves to Case No. 16577. 
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Statements made by Nicole at preliminary hearing 
have already been set forth. 
On June 6, 1979, in District Court, Nicole testified 
that she was almost eight (R.064); that her birthday was 
July 27th (R.065), as distinguished from an answer to the s• 
question at preliminary hearing as being July 7th; that she 
went to school and was in the 1st grade (R.065), and then 
changed to the second grade (R.067-068); that she got good 
grades (R.065); that her teacher was Miss Johnson, although 
she had previously testified that her teacher was Miss 
Galloway. 
She testified that she knew what it meant to tell the 
truth (R.066); that if you lied you got in trouble (R.066); 
she remembered Mr. Draney questioning her at preliminary hear· 
ing, but didn't remember what her answers were on each questic 
where she had indicated she didn't know the difference betweei 
right or wrong or what it meant to tell a lie. 
She found out what it meant to tell a lie and tell th' 
truth in the second grade; she didn't know in the first grade. 
She had never been in trouble nor been spanked for telling a 
lie, although she admitted she did tell lies (R.070). 
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With this background, the court refused the County 
Attorney's request to make a ruling on the competency of the 
child (R. 072). 
She thereafter testified that he (the defendant) put 
his finger "where she went to the bathroom" in the front room 
on the couch under an afghan (R.074). (At preliminary hearing 
she testified that it was under a blanket in the bedroom, then 
under a blanket in the family room [R.39 and 40*)). When 
asked how many times he put his finger there, she didn't 
remember. 
She said the incident happened in 1978 "just after 
summer" (R. 076); (the preliminary hearing was held in July of 
1978 and the initial complaint brought in June of 1978 (R.0211). 
When asked how long she had been at her father's place, 
she said "I think about a week or three--or three days" (R.079): 
when asked how often she visited her father, her answer was, 
"Once a week, sometimes" (R.079). When asked the question, "How 
long do you stay?" her answer was "three days" (R.079). 
On cross examination, Nicole admitted that at prelim-
inary hearing she had testified it happened on the bed in 
granddaddy's room (R.079) and that on the day she sat on a couch 
in the front room her grandma was in the same room in a chair 
(R.079-080). 
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Again, she admitted that she said at preliminary hearin· 
"a blanket on the bed, instead of an afghan on the couch (R. 08! 
When she claimed that he touched her, she doesn't remember 
whether anyone said anything; she remembers no details ( R. 082-~' 
Her grandmother was there all of the time (R.085). 
When asked if her grandmother said anything to her granc· 
father, she didn't know (R.085*); she repeated that it happ~~ 
"right after summer" in 1978 (R.085); she couldn't remember 
whether she missed any school (R.085). 
She went to her father's, "I think I went a week" (R.Oif 
she couldn't remember how long she was with her grandfather and 
grandmother (R.086). 
At R. 090 she again testified that she knew this year was 
1979 and restated that the things that happened on the couch 
were in 1978 "right after summer" for the third time. It is 
stated again that the complaint and preliminary hearing were ~~ 
to that time (R.l and R.2). 
Mr. Robert May was called as a witness and testified 
that Nicole spent the summer of 1977 and 1978 with her natural 
father. When asked if he knew if she had spent any time in 
the summer or fall of 19 7 7 with her grandparents, he answered, 
"I don't know that." 
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There was no further testimony for the State and the 
State rested. 
For the defense, Mrs. Donna Wilkerson testified at R.99 
as follows: She is the wife of the defendant (R.107); that she 
is the grandmother of Nicole (R.109); that there was no time 
during the prior two years when Nicole, after a bath, had been 
sitting on her grandfather's knee under an afghan, nor had she 
been in the presence of Nicole and her husband at any time when 
he touched her indecently or did anything she would consider 
unusual (R.111). 
There was no cross examination. 
The defendant testified he was the grandfather of Nicole 
and at no time had he touched her improperly (R.113). 
On cross-examination, he denied that at any time he 
made a statement that he had a problem and was getting help for 
it, however, he did make a statement to the effect that if Nicole 
needed any treatment that he would pay for it (R.0114). 
Deputy Horrocks testified on rebuttal that at one time 
Mr. Wilkerson called him to a meeting where he said something 
about his having been to a psychiatrist (R.0117-0118). 
Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, which was 
taken under advisement by the court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING NICOLE TO TESTIFY AS THERE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION AS TO HER COMPETENCY TO THE POINT HE 
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION. 
Section 78-24-2, Utah Code Annotated provided: 
"(2) Children under ten years of age, who 
appear incapable of receiving just impressions of 
the facts respecting which they are examined, or 
of relating them truly" cannot be witnesses. 
The case law properly holds that discretion is in the 
trial judge as trier of the law to rule on competency by not the' 
age of the child, but the child's mental capacity, the condition' 
factors; that it is the court's duty to adequately qualify the 
witness. See State v. Taylor, 21 Utah 2d 425; 446 P.2d 954, 
page 955: 
"[2] The two girls were not adequately qualified 
as witnesses. Their awareness as to the difference 
between right and wrong and understanding of telling 
the truth as against a lie was not sufficiently 
established. In other words, their competency to 
testify was not established." (Citing State v. Smith, 
16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965). 
Continuing with the Taylor citation, it does not appear 
from the record that: 
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" ... an appropriate objection was made to the witnesses' 
competency. A survey of the record casts grave doubt 
upon the ability of S to understand questions without 
a cue from the prosecutor as to the desired responses. 
For example: 
Q. [by prosecutor] ... But ycu won't lie heretoday. Is 
that right? You know this is very important that you 
don't lie, don't you? Tell the whole truth today and 
not add anything to it. Say the answer. No. Say I 
won't. [Emphasis added.] ~~-
A. I won't 
When the defense attorney interrogated s, he asked: 
Q. Do you know what a lie is, S? 
A. No. 
During the direct examination of the younger child, C, 
the prosecutor instructed ter response seven times, in 
addition, to his obvious cues to elicit the desired 
answers. 
A careful survey of the record compels one to 
conclude that the older child had no independent 
recollection of the matter ~rom her responses to the 
questions. If one deletes hsr answers to leading 
questions which contained obvious cues as to the 
desired response, her testimony is limited to 'I don't 
know,' and 'I don't remember.' Furthermore, from the 
extremely limited testimony on the subject matter, 
there emerges a serious doubt a: to whether the children 
had any sense of moral duty to !:ell the truth. The sole 
sanction with which they were familiar for relating a 
falsehood was a reprimand by their stepfather, the 
defendant, with whom they no lonC"er lived" 
The above cases are cited due to similarity in the factual 
situations. In both cases, as with this case, the testimony of 
the infants, two girls in the Taylor case, and Nicole in this 
case, constitute the sole evidence against the defendant. 
In both cases there is little evidence to show that the 
witnesses had an understandin~ of telling the truth and there is 
-11-
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an entire lack as to both girls in the Taylor case and Nicole ir. 
this case of having a sense of moral duty to tell the truth. In 
this case the trial judge was aware that Nicole had testified at 
preliminary hearing that she did not know the difference between 
what it was to tell the truth or to tell a lie (R. 29*); that she 
didn't know what it was to hold up her hand before the judge; shE 
didn't know the difference ~etween right and wrong (R.29) and 
further and more important at R. 52 from the preliminary hearing 
transcript the following la~guage: 
Q. (By Mr. Hanson): And did your Mom ever tell you 
what to say when you got here in court today? 
A. Yes. 
Followed by Mr. Draney's question at R.53: 
Q. Nicole, you 3aid you talked to your Mommy about 
these things; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did your Mommy ever tell vou about what happened or 
did you tell her what happened? 
A. I can't remember. 
The transcript of the preliminary hearing was before the 
trial judge as Exhibit "A" when he denie:"° a thoroughly briefed 
motion to quash based on Nicole's testimony (See R.14*) through 
R. 70*}. The judge was also aware of the testimony to qualify her 
as a witness at trial (R. 64 to R. 70), where she testified that 5:1: 
was in the first grade last year, which is the same as the testim:· 
-12-
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eleven months before at preliminary hearing (R.65); she had to 
be corrected to answer that she was in the second grade (R.69); 
that she had no memory of her answers at preliminary hearing to 
Mr. Draney's questions as to the difference between truth or lies. 
The judge was also a~are that she was cognizant that she had 
testified at preliminary he~ring that the act constituting the 
crime happened in the bedroom in her grandparents' horre but that at 
trial it happened on the couch in the front room with her grand-
mother sitting in the chair in the same room (R.81). 
At the end of the State's attempt to qualify Nicole, the 
judge stated: 
" ... I'm not going to make ~ny formal decision as to her 
competency at this time" (R.072), 
but took the matter under advisement and didn't rule until his final 
decision on guilt or innocence (R.102-103), wherein he points out 
the child's difficulty in remembering time sequences and her fre-
quent pauses which he attributes to the "tender age of the child" 
and the lapses of time and the difficulty of the subject matter. 
The one affirmative point in the decision was "the evidence indicated 
she was a good student in school" (R.102). 
The only evidence in the record as to her grades is at R.65: 
"Q. What kind of grades did you get in school this last 
year, Nicole? 
A. Good grades." 
It must be remembered h"re that she was confused as to what 
grade she had been in last year, having answered "the first grade" 
-13-
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at R. 6 5 and then changed to "the second grade" at R. 6 8 . She wi, 
also confused as to what teacher she had in which grade. 
When questioned as to her grades at preliminary hearing, 
she had no memory as to what kind of grades she got ( R. 2 8) . The 
child had no relationship to the tirre period in which she indica: 
that the instant charge took place, answered at R.76: "Just afts. 
summer", and at preliminary hearing that she didn't know what fr 
of the year it purportedly ~appened (R.37*). 
Nicole also testifiei that this happened the first ti~~ 
1978 (R. 76) "Just after sum:ner", and then again at R.85 "--right 
after summer in 1978"; then at R.90 in cross-examination she 
answered the following question: 
"Q What year is it? 
A 1979. 
Q And you said that this rratter that happened to you on 
the couch at your grandfather's was in 1978, is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q Are you sure of that? 
A Yes." 
The initial complaint is dated Ju'1e 5, 1978 (R.2) and the 
preliminary hearing was held on July 11, 1978 (R.16), both nr&~ 
ing the period the witness is talking about. 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO MAKE A DETERMINATION 
OF THE DEFENDANT'S GUILT TO THE REQUIRED DEGREE OF GUILT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
This case is a criminal case charging a felony. The 
State's burden of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt". 
The writer has set forth the testimony of Nicole and 
the findings of fact in detail and has discussed that testimony with 
record citations. The record shows that the only additional evi-
dence the State put on is the testimony of the stepfather, Robert 
May, for two pages at R.54 and R.55* in the preliminary hearing 
and at R.95 and R.96 at the trial, a fair summary of those pages 
being that he couldn't place Nicole at her grandfather's (the 
defendant's) home at any time alt'"•ough she did spend both the 
summer of 1977 and 1978 at her fathsr's home and he, the witness, 
was at Lake Powell during the second er third week of September in 
1977 and he could not place Nicole's wtereabouts at that time. 
For the defense, Mrs. Donna ~ilkerson testified (R.110-
111) that she is the wife of defendant and the grandmother of 
Nicole; that she had seen the grandfath~r and grandchild together 
many times; that she at no time had seen them sitting on the 
couch in the living room at the same tir·e with an afghan over them. 
The defendant testified at R.112-113 denying any improper 
conduct with Nicole at any time. On cross-examination he denied 
making a statement that he had a problem and was getting help for 
it. 
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It must be pointen out that more detailed denials co•; 
not be made because the information was couched in the language 
that the alleged criminal act occurred on or about September li. 
1977. There was never any ~vidence placing the alleged cri~t 
that time, or at any other jate or period of time, the only evi-
dence being that the crime took pla.ce, if it did take place, " 
after summer" in 1978. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO TIME FRA~E TC PROTECT THE DEFENDANT OR TC 
MAKE A JEOPARDY ON EITHER THE :'HIDING OF GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY. 
As previously pointed o•.lt, the court took both this: 
and its companion case under advisement as to both consider ~ 
guilt and innocence and the question of competency of the witne 
and made decisions in both cases on the same date, July 23, ir 
which are identical except for the ca>e number. There are no 
findings of fact or conclusions of law or statements as to w~a: 
time, if any, the crimes were proved. 
The statements of Nicole as to sexual abuse vari~~ 
a period of more than a year. In the forcible sodomy case, t:; 
complaint and information indicated "on or about the 24th d~c 
February". There is no evidence, other than Nicole's testimor.: 
placing her in Duchesne in 1?ebruary, her testimony being t•.·· 
the alleged crime was "before Christma3" and her stepfather's 
testimony fails to show tha~ she was in Duchesne at any time 
relative to Christmas, either before or after. 
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The writer has reviewed carefully the cases involved 
in the question of competency. See State v. Blythe, 20 Utah 378, 
58 P.1108 (1899); State v. r.brasco, 42 Utah 5, 128 P.571 (1912); 
State v. MacMillan 46 Utah 19, 145 P.833; State v. Zeegich, 61 Utah 
61, 210 P.927 (1922); State v. Smith, supra, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 
445 (1965), in re Donnelley v. The Territory, 5 Ariz. 291, 52 P. 398. 
In each case the court places emphasis on the ability of 
the child to preserve and understand the meaning of an oath; to 
have the moral sense to apryreciate the difference between right 
and wrong; also, in each of those cases there was competent evi-
dence to support the testimony of the child, for example, in 
State v. Smith, supra, the evidence shows a mother finding doors 
locked and seeing through a window the child and the defendant 
lying on a bed. It would appear the Utah case, State v. Taylor, 
supra, controlled in this matter wherein the court was held to 
have abused its discretion in allowing testimony of a child under 
the age of ten and it should be pointed out that in that case 
there were two children, ages seven and eight, and not just one 
six-year old child. 
Additionally, we agree that while the date alleged in 
the information may vary within the statute of limitations, it is 
necessary for the State to prove beyon~ a reasonable doubt an 
offense on some date that will constitute jeopardy for the defen-
dant after trial, regardless of conviction. Here there is no 
such date. 
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CONCLUSION 
In closing, we ask special consideration, together 
with the rest of the record, on the six-year old's statement at 
R.52, line 18, et seq: 
"Q. And did your Mom ever tell you what to say wh~ 
you got here in court today? 
A. Yes. 
MR. HANSON: I t1:1ink that's all I have, Your Honor, 
I realize she is a little girl. She is getting tired." 
REDIRECT EYAMINATION 
BY MR. DRANEY: 
Q. Nicole, you said that you talked to your Mommy abc. 
these things; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did your Mormny ever t :\ll you about what happened 
or did you tell her what happe1ed? 
A. I can't remember." 
Res~ectfully supmitted, 
I ., -
/I,/ _,/,lj-r_ .· d//t ;/ -. ; / //':,_ /,//; 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorney for Defendant 
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